ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? CEPS Working Document No. 397, June 2014

Saka, Orkun and Fuertes, Ana-Maria and Kalotychou, Elena (2014) ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? CEPS Working Document No. 397, June 2014. [Working Paper]

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (4Mb) | Preview

Abstract

Paul De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis states that member countries of a monetary union such as the eurozone are highly vulnerable to a self-fulfilling mechanism by which the efforts of investors to avoid losses from default can end up triggering the very default they fear. The authors test this hypothesis by applying an eclectic methodology to a time window around Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” (to keep the eurozone on firm footing) pledge on 26 July 2012. This pledge was soon followed by the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme (the prospective and conditional purchase by the European Central Bank of sovereign bonds of eurozone countries having difficulty issuing debt). The principal components of eurozone credit default swap spreads validate this choice of time frame. An event study reveals significant pre announcement contagion emanating from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria. Furthermore, time-series regression confirms frequent clusters of large shocks affecting the credit default swap spreads of the four eurozone countries but solely during the pre-announcement period. The findings of this report support the fragility hypothesis for the eurozone and endorse the Outright Monetary Transactions programme.

Actions (login required)