Link to the University of Pittsburgh
Link to the University Library SystemContact us link
AEI Banner

Monetary and macroprudential policy games in a monetary union. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 304

Dennis, Richard and Ilbas, Pelin (2016) Monetary and macroprudential policy games in a monetary union. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 304. [Working Paper]

[img] PDF - Published Version
Download (400Kb)

    Abstract

    We use the two-country model of the euro area developed by Quint and Rabanal (2014) to study policymaking in the European Monetary Union (EMU). In particular, we focus on strategic interactions: 1) between monetary policy and a common macroprudential authority, and; 2) between an EMU-level monetary authority and regional macroprudential authorities. In the first case, price stability and financial stability are pursued at the EMU level, while in the second case each macroprudential authority adopts region-specific objectives. We compare cooperative equilibria in the simultaneous-move and leadership solutions, each obtained assuming policy discretion. Further, we assess the effects on policy performance of assigning shared objectives across policymakers and of altering the level of importance attached to various policy objectives.

    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII (Chicago style) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:
    Item Type: Working Paper
    Uncontrolled Keywords: Monetary policy, macroprudential policy, policy coordination
    Subjects for non-EU documents: Countries > Belgium
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > monetary policy
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > National Bank of Belgium (Brussels) > Working Papers
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2019 11:25
    Number of Pages: 34
    Last Modified: 09 Sep 2019 11:25
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/97447

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads