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The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement. Bruegel Working Paper 2016/02, February 2016

Van Damme, Eric and Zhou, Jun (2016) The dynamics of leniency application and the knock-on effect of cartel enforcement. Bruegel Working Paper 2016/02, February 2016. [Working Paper]

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    Abstract

    The authors study the timing of leniency applications using a novel application of multi-spell discrete-time survival analysis for a sample of cartels prosecuted by the European Commission between 1996 and 2014. The start of a Commission investigation does not affect the rate by which conspirators apply for leniency in the market investigated, but increases the rate of application in separate markets in which a conspirator in the investigated market also engaged in collusion. The revision of the Commission’s leniency programme in 2002 increased the rate of pre-investigation applications. Our results shed light on enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > competition policy
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Bruegel (Brussels) > Working Papers
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 29 Feb 2016 13:26
    Number of Pages: 41
    Last Modified: 29 Nov 2016 09:10
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/72911

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