"British Exit, German Voice, French Loyalty: Defection, Domination, and Cooperation in the 1992-93 ERM Crisis"

Cameron, David R. (1993) "British Exit, German Voice, French Loyalty: Defection, Domination, and Cooperation in the 1992-93 ERM Crisis". In: UNSPECIFIED, Washington, DC. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

[From the Introduction]. Why did the two governments respond as they did? Why, in particular, did the British Conservative government--despite its commitment to price stability and a strong pound, despite the fact that it had just won an election and would not need to face the electorate for several years, despite the good reasons for remaining in the ERM, not least of which were the British occupancy of the Council presidency and John Major's carefully cultivated relationship with Helmut Kohl--nevertheless decide to exit? Why, on the other hand, did the French Socialist government--despite its presumed commitment to employment and growth, despite the high level of unemployment and low rate of growth produced by its "franc fort" policy, and despite the impending elections that threatened a landslide defeat for the government at the hands of the conservative parties(7)--nevertheless decide to remain inside the ERM, regardless of the cost? In addressing these questions, I consider three alternative types of explanation. One involves a domestic politics approach that attributes the different responses in Britain and France to differences in their internal politics--for example, to differences in the economic preferences of government or the structure and influence of relevant political and economic actors. The second approach involves international politics and attributes the different responses to the structure of the international system within which the two countries are located--in particular, to the preferences and influence of Germany, the dominant actor in the European monetary regime. The third approach involves international regimes, viewed as polities, and attributes the different responses to the institutionalized interactions and norms within the European monetary regime--in particular, to the difference between the two countries in their roles within the institutions of the EMS, the extent to which they had internalized the norms of the EMS, and their involvement in transnational and transgovernmental relations within the regime.

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