Wiberg, Matti. (2005) New Winners and Old Losers. A Priori Voting Power in the EU25. ZEI Discussion Papers C. 149, 2005. [Discussion Paper]
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Abstract
[From the Introduction]. Analysis of the development of power distributions is one of the core tasks of political science. How much do the EU member states have a priori voting power in the Council of Ministers? In particular, what have the modifications in the voting weights after the various enlargements meant for the distribution of a priori voting power in the Council? We will in the following use the standardized Penrose-Banzhaf-index when analyzing the distribution of power among member-states (Banzhaf 1965 and Penrose 1946) (cf. Raunio and Wiberg 1998 and 2002).
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Item Type: | Discussion Paper |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Council voting. |
Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > institutional development/policy > general EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > Council of Ministers |
Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
Series: | Series > University of Bonn, Center for European Integration Studies > ZEI Discussion Papers |
Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
Official EU Document: | No |
Language: | English |
Date Deposited: | 23 Feb 2008 |
Page Range: | p. 28 |
Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2011 17:44 |
URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/6823 |
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