"Distributive versus regulatory: How does policy type affect the influence of the European Parliament?"

Burns, Charlotte. (2003) "Distributive versus regulatory: How does policy type affect the influence of the European Parliament?". In: UNSPECIFIED, Nashville, TN. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In recent years there has been a growth in the literature seeking to determine how and why the European Parliament (EP) exercises legislative influence. However, much of the debate has focused either upon rational choice new institutionalist models of decision-making, or statistical analysis of the adoption of EP amendments. Consequently, the other key body of literature on EP influence, which focuses upon qualitative case studies, has become rather neglected. There has been a tendency for this latter work to be criticized and dismissed because it does not engage in systematic theoretical development and rigorous testing of hypotheses. As a result, the claims made by authors located in this branch of the literature have not been subject to the same scrutiny and testing as the work of authors such as Tsebelis and various collaborators. This paper seeks to redress this imbalance in the literature by testing the claims made by Shackleton that a key variable affecting the EP's ability to shape legislation is the type of policy under consideration--distributive or regulatory-and the distribution costs and benefits arising from it. Using data from several case studies, the paper explores the problems associated with trying to define such costs and benefits. It is argued that the key determinants of the EP's influence are the level and type of costs and the group of actors upon which they are imposed.

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