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Overthrowing Secrecy: The Spitzenkandidaten experiment and a new chance for a European party system. CEPS Commentary, 4 August 2014

Baldoni, Roberto and Gänzle, Stefan and Shackleton, Michael. (2014) Overthrowing Secrecy: The Spitzenkandidaten experiment and a new chance for a European party system. CEPS Commentary, 4 August 2014. [Policy Paper]

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    Abstract

    The Spitzenkandidaten experiment has been at the centre of a heated debate for several months now, prompting much speculation as to the changes it will bring to the balance of power between the EU institutions. But the real coup d’état has been directed against the old process of appointing the European Commission President behind closed doors. Although the new procedure entails “a number of political, institutional and ‘thus’ constitutional ambiguities”, according to the authors of this commentary, it has rendered that process more transparent, if not more democratic – and will almost certainly endure to the next European elections in 2019 and beyond. As a result, they conclude that the new procedure is likely to trigger important changes in Europe’s political parties and elections.

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    Item Type: Policy Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > institutional development/policy > general
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Commentaries
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 05 Aug 2014 08:28
    Number of Pages: 3
    Last Modified: 05 Aug 2014 08:28
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/53004

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