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Why firms avoid cutting wages: Survey evidence from European firms. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 251, December 2013

Du Caju, Philip and Kosma, Theodora and Lawless, Martina and Messina, Julián and Rõõm, Tairi (2013) Why firms avoid cutting wages: Survey evidence from European firms. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 251, December 2013. [Working Paper]

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    Abstract

    The rarity with which firms reduce nominal wages has been frequently observed, even in the face of considerable negative economic shocks. This paper uses a unique survey of fourteen European countries to ask firms directly about the incidence of wage cuts and to assess the relevance of a range of potential reasons for why they avoid cutting wages. Concerns about the retention of productive staff and a lowering of morale and effort were reported as key reasons for downward wage rigidity across all countries and firm types. Restrictions created by collective bargaining were found to be an important consideration for firms in euro area countries but were one of the lowest ranked obstacles in non-euro area countries. The paper examines how firm characteristics and collective bargaining institutions affect the relevance of each of the common explanations put forward for the infrequency of wage cuts.

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > employment/labour market > industrial/labour relations
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > National Bank of Belgium (Brussels) > Working Papers
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2014 19:54
    Number of Pages: 39
    Last Modified: 11 Apr 2014 12:51
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/47665

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