Package deals in EU decision-making

Kardasheva, Raya (2009) Package deals in EU decision-making. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Submitted)

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Abstract

This is a paper about legislative package deals in the European Union and their effects on EU policy outcomes. It analyzes inter-chamber legislative exchange between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The key argument is that package deals increase the legislative influence of the European Parliament across legislative procedures and policy areas. Package deals allow Member States to establish control over the financial aspects of legislation and to ensure its adoption without delay. In exchange, the European Parliament gains further institutional powers and access to some of the EU’s most salient policy areas. The argument is tested empirically through the quantitative analysis of 1465 co-decision and consultation proposals, 19 policy areas and 8 years. The results indicate that the use of package deals in the EU is conditional on the distributive nature of legislative proposals, and their urgency. In turn, package deals extend the EP’s legislative influence in distributive policy areas and increase its institutional powers.

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