"Why increasing transparency in the European Union will not make lobbyists behave any better than they already do"

Naurin, Daniel. (2005) "Why increasing transparency in the European Union will not make lobbyists behave any better than they already do". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

[From the Abstract]. According to deliberative democratic theorists transparency has a civilizing effect on political behaviour, forcing actors to argue public-regardingly instead of engaging in self-interested bargaining. Negotiation theorists, on the other hand, warn that transparency may damage effective problem-solving and lead to harder group polarization. This paper scrutinizes this debate, points at the different assumptions underlying the competing hypothesis and subsequently tests these in a comparative study of business lobbyists acting in institutional settings characterised by varying degrees of transparency in Sweden and the European Union. The results support the negotiation theory hypothesis, but it is also seen that a deliberative perspective is necessary to understand the behaviour of lobbyists backstage and that standard two-level games often will be inadequate for understanding transparency effects.... This article investigates the debate over the effects of transparency and publicity on elite political behaviour.

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