"Networking with National Authorities: Information Sharing and Bureaucratic Accountability in the European Union"

Kourtikakis, Kostas. (2005) "Networking with National Authorities: Information Sharing and Bureaucratic Accountability in the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, TX. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

How can European Union (EU) institutions ensure that member-state public officials implement Community policies? Given the diversity of administrative traditions and the variation of bureaucratic effectiveness among member states, does the EU simply trust national accountability mechanisms to guarantee a uniform application of its policies? I argue that the EU seeks additional guarantees. Specifically, I focus on the informal networks of those officials form with both EU and national institutions, who investigate accounting irregularities and citizen complaints. Unlike the traditional hierarchical mechanisms of bureaucratic control, not only do networks make the typically insulated bureaucratic activity more transparent, but also they overcome an EU-specific problem, namely that supranational institutions are prohibited from exercising control on member-state authorities. In particular, I examine the networks created around the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors. In those networks, national officials share information with their EU and member-state counterparts as equals. I find that, as a result, national officials become more informed about and more sensitive to the application of EU policies. Consequently, they are more prone to enforce Community policies or refer any instances of insufficient or deficient EU policy application to the appropriate national or EU bodies.

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