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"Choosing chameleons: National interests and the logic of coalition building in the Commission of the European Union"

Schneider, Gerald. (1997) "Choosing chameleons: National interests and the logic of coalition building in the Commission of the European Union". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    To the dismay of their own governments, newly appointed members of the Commission often change colour and become more integrationist than initially expected. Sociological integration theories assume that the experience in Brussels induces EU commissioners to adopt a pro-European policy in the long run. In this article, I reexamine this claim by systematically analyzing the appointment process and the politics of coalition building within the European Commission. A portfolio allocation model shows the conditions under which commissioners opt for more integration in order to increase their internal influence despite conflicting interests of their member states.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Additional Information: Coalition building; sociological integration theory.
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > European Commission
    EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > institutional development/policy > decision making/policy-making
    Other > integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 1997 (5th), May 29-June 1, 1997
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 15 Mar 2007
    Page Range: p. 17
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:23
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2721

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