The Effects of Ministerial Turnover on the Vertical Articulation of Power in the Council of the EU

Perez, Lauren K. and Scherpereel, John A. (2015) The Effects of Ministerial Turnover on the Vertical Articulation of Power in the Council of the EU. [Conference Proceedings] (Submitted)

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Abstract

This paper seeks to determine how high levels of turnover at the apex of the Council of the European Union affect the relative strength of ministers and bureaucrats in the Council system. We test two rival hypotheses. One hypothesis, based in the general political science literature on legislatures, suggests that high rates of turnover will empower bureaucrats. A second hypothesis, based on previous studies of ministers and bureaucrats in the Council, implies that high rates of turnover will increase uncertainty and drive up ministerial involvement. The paper begins by presenting descriptive statistics on ministerial turnover in the Council. It shows that, by any metric, rates of Council turnover are very high. We then present statistical models that gauge the effects of turnover on the level at which Council decisions are made. We find support for the classical comparative hypothesis—higher levels of turnover are associated with lower levels of control by nominal principals. This finding generates new insights into Council dynamics and informs debates about the nature and conditions of accountability in the EU.

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