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Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits. CEPS Special Report No. 137/April 2016 Wednesday, 27 April 2016

Vandenbroucke, Frank and Luigjes, Chris and Wood, Donna and Lievens, Kim (2016) Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits. CEPS Special Report No. 137/April 2016 Wednesday, 27 April 2016. UNSPECIFIED.

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    Abstract

    This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme.

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    Item Type: Other
    Uncontrolled Keywords: Australia; Canada;
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > External relations > EU-US
    Countries > Austria
    Countries > Belgium
    Countries > Denmark
    Countries > Germany
    Countries > Switzerland
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > employment/labour market > employment/unemployment
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Special Reports
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2016 13:19
    Number of Pages: 89
    Last Modified: 28 Apr 2016 13:19
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/74979

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