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Democratic Contestation, Accountability, and Citizen Satisfaction at the Regional Level. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.2, 2004

Tvinnereim, Endre M. (2004) Democratic Contestation, Accountability, and Citizen Satisfaction at the Regional Level. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.2, 2004. [Working Paper]

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    Abstract

    Democratic theory tells us that competition between political parties fosters more responsive government by disciplining elected leaders. Yet party competition may not always attain the levels desirable for holding leaders accountable, notably at the sub-national level. This paper hypothesizes that variations in competition-induced accountability affect regional, or state, government behavior, and that this variation is reflected in citizen satisfaction with regional government performance. The hypothesis is confirmed using survey data from sixty-eight German state election studies. Specifically, a widening of the gap between the two main parties of each state is shown to affect subsequent individual-level satisfaction negatively. This finding presents a conjecture that should be generalizable to other countries with strong sub-national units.

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: Countries > Germany
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > democracy/democratic deficit
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > governance: EU & national level > subnational/regional/territorial
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Harvard University, Center for European Studies > Program for the Study of Germany and European Working Papers Series
    Depositing User: Unnamed user with email kms214@pitt.edu
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2015 15:40
    Number of Pages: 32
    Last Modified: 22 Apr 2015 15:52
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/63720

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