Verhelst, Stijn (2012) How EU Fiscal Norms Will Become a Safety Net for the Failure of National Golden Rules. European Policy Brief No. 6, January 2012. [Policy Paper]
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Abstract
If introduced successfully, national Golden Rules will completely overturn fiscal governance in the eurozone. Golden Rules would almost always be more stringent than EU-level fiscal norms. EU fiscal norms will hence evolve into a safety net in case a Golden Rule fails. The possibility of such a failure is, indeed, not to be dismissed. Because of the severity of the Golden Rules, eurozone leaders should reflect on their design. There is a real risk that they will undercut public investment, which would be at the cost of the EU’s other long-term challenges.
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Item Type: | Policy Paper |
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Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > fiscal policy |
Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
Series: | Series > Egmont : Royal Institute for International Affairs > European Policy Briefs |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email kms214@pitt.edu |
Official EU Document: | No |
Language: | English |
Date Deposited: | 23 Apr 2015 12:26 |
Number of Pages: | 10 |
Last Modified: | 23 Apr 2015 12:26 |
URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/63521 |
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