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Information Effects and Mass Support for EU Policy Control

Clark, Nick and Hellwig, Timothy (2011) Information Effects and Mass Support for EU Policy Control. [Conference Proceedings]

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    The European Union, it is often noted, suffers from a democracy deficit. Most critiques of EU democracy focus on problems of institutional design, such as the distance between the European public and the EU policy-making bodies, or behavioral factors like participation in European Parliament elections. However, democracy also requires an active and informed citizenry. In this paper, we examine the impact of an informed public on support for European-level policy competencies. Is public skepticism of EU authority shaped by a lack of knowledge, or are preferences over the locus of policy control unbiased by information? Our analysis of mass preferences for policy control over 27 issue areas reveals that, in every case, a paucity of knowledge about the EU depresses popular support for European policy jurisdiction. Further analyses show that possessing of information about Europe affects supports for EU control in issue areas clearly involving cross-border or regional problems rather than areas associated with the Single Market

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    Item Type: Conference Proceedings
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > democracy/democratic deficit
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2011 (12th), April 23-25, 2011
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 19 Nov 2019 14:22
    Number of Pages: 25
    Last Modified: 19 Nov 2019 14:22

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