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EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as Usual? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 32, November 2013

Osteikoetxea, Eguzki (2013) EU Trade Actors after Lisbon: Enhanced Negotiations or Business as Usual? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 32, November 2013. UNSPECIFIED.

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    Abstract

    As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.

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    Item Type: Other
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > External relations > EU-Latin America
    Countries > Ukraine
    EU policies and themes > External relations > international trade
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > College of Europe (Brugge) > Bruges Political Research Papers
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 18 Mar 2014 20:23
    Number of Pages: 36
    Last Modified: 02 Apr 2015 12:09
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/47654

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