Marzinotto, Benedicta and Sapir, André and Wolff, Guntram B. (2011) What kind of fiscal union? Bruegel Policy Brief 2011/06, November 2011. [Policy Paper]
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Abstract
The euro area's shortcomings have become abundantly clear. It was set up without powers of strict surveillance over macroeconomic imbalances, crisis management and resolution instruments, or adequate banking supervision and resolution tools. The core reason for these failures is the absence of a fiscal union with corresponding authority over fiscal, structural and banking policies. Attempts to right these wrongs have been ad hoc and have so far fallen short and moral hazard is prevalent. Financial markets are increasingly aware of these inadequacies, and have started to price in the possibility of the break up of the euro area.
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Item Type: | Policy Paper |
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Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance |
Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
Series: | Series > Bruegel (Brussels) > Policy Briefs |
Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
Official EU Document: | No |
Language: | English |
Date Deposited: | 06 Dec 2011 13:04 |
Number of Pages: | 8 |
Last Modified: | 06 Dec 2011 13:04 |
URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/33003 |
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