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Temporary work agencies and equilibrium unemployment. CES Germany & Europe Working Paper no. 02.6, 2002

Neugart, Michael, and Storrie, Donald. (2002) Temporary work agencies and equilibrium unemployment. CES Germany & Europe Working Paper no. 02.6, 2002. [Working Paper]

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    A striking feature of OECD labor markets in the 1990s has been the very rapid increase of temporary agency work. We augment the equilibrium unemployment model as developed by Pissarides and Mortensen with temporary work agencies in order to focus on their role as matching intermediaries and to examine the aggregate impact on employment. Our model implies that the improvement in the matching efficiency of agencies led to the emergence and growth of temporary agency work. We also show that temporary agency work does not necessarily crowd out other jobs. In this paper we extend an equilibrium unemployment model, as in Diamond (1981), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1990) with temporary agency work in order to focus on its role as a matching intermediary and its aggregate impact on employment.

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Uncontrolled Keywords: temporary work agencies, matching model, equilibrium unemployment, crowding out
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > employment/labour market > employment/unemployment
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Harvard University, Center for European Studies > Program for the Study of Germany and European Working Papers Series
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 20 Aug 2009
    Page Range: p. 31
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 18:00

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