“Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability”

Tallberg, Jonas. (1999) “Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

The argument here is developed in three stages. First, I explain why the focus on post-decisional enforcement rather than pre-decisional agenda-setting requires an extended principal-supervisor-agent model. Second, I show how the ECJ, by exploiting its judicial independence and member governments’ lack of intrusive monitoring mechanisms, succeeded in introducing a form of decentralized sanctions that national governments on repeated occasion had decided against. Third, I account for member states’ two-folded attempts to sanction the Court and state liability: the failed attack at the 1996-97 IGC, and the temporarily more successful option of inaction at the national level.

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