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Tying Hands Is Not Commitment: Can Fiscal Rules and Institutions Really Enhance Fiscal Discipline? Bruegel Working Papers, 2007/01, January 2007

Debrun, Xavier. (2007) Tying Hands Is Not Commitment: Can Fiscal Rules and Institutions Really Enhance Fiscal Discipline? Bruegel Working Papers, 2007/01, January 2007. [Working Paper]

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    Abstract

    Visiting Bruegel Scholar Xavier Debrun discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > fiscal policy
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > budgets & financing
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Bruegel (Brussels) > Working Papers
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2008
    Page Range: p. 43
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:53
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8405

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