Debrun, Xavier. (2007) Tying Hands Is Not Commitment: Can Fiscal Rules and Institutions Really Enhance Fiscal Discipline? Bruegel Working Papers, 2007/01, January 2007. [Working Paper]
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Abstract
Visiting Bruegel Scholar Xavier Debrun discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.
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| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > fiscal policy EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > budgets & financing |
| Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
| Series: | Series > Bruegel (Brussels) > Working Papers |
| Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
| Official EU Document: | No |
| Language: | English |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Jul 2008 |
| Page Range: | p. 43 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2011 17:53 |
| URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8405 |
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