Europe: Neither Plan Colombia, nor Peace Process--From Good Intentions to High Frustrations. Working Paper Series, Vol. 2 No. 7, June 2002

Roy, Joaquin. (2002) Europe: Neither Plan Colombia, nor Peace Process--From Good Intentions to High Frustrations. Working Paper Series, Vol. 2 No. 7, June 2002. [Working Paper]

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Abstract

(From the introduction). At the same time, a clear message was sent that Europe wanted to distance itself as much as possible from the Plan Colombia, understood as a project centered around counter-insurgency and security issues. After a brief period of uncertainty and the successful and hopeful attempts to revive the Peace Process, the European diplomacy seemed to have its role strengthened from a rank of mere observer to a status of participant in brokering the Peace Process, which was on the verge of collapse in early January 2002. The renewal of the process was then credited to the role of the international community, with heavy European involvement. However, apprehension, pessimism, and a certain degree of realism finally set in the minds of European leaders in view of the decision by President Andrés Pastrana of Colombia to terminate the peace process on February 20, 2002. Considering the continuation of the violent activities perpetrated by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), culminating with the kidnapping of Eduardo Gechem Turbay, a prominent Colombian senator, Pastrana ordered the Colombian troops to enter the territory previously awarded as sanctuary. (4) Meanwhile, under the new Bush administration, U.S. opinion had already shifted toward a more hard line attitude, as former Clinton administration officials reflected in timely columns. (5) Editorials endorsed President Bush’s attempts to make U.S. support more effective. (6) These published opinions confirm that many U.S. elite had significantly shifted toward the idea of more active participation in the Colombian conflict, sidelining the peace negotiations as an apparent result of the attacks of September 11. “Terrorism” was the code word widely used, replacing “counter-insurgency strategy” and “curtailing narco-trafficking” which was the original framework sold to Congress to justify the need for Plan Colombia. The Colombian government began to lobby energetically for the use of U.S. counter-drug trafficking resources in the anti-insurgency activities, equating the fight against the FARC to the military offensive against Al Qaeda. (7) In public statements, the White House limited its position to the parameters outlined by Congress in the fight against drugs. (8)

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