"External democratization beyond EU enlargement: the case of Algeria and Ukraine"

Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie. (2007) "External democratization beyond EU enlargement: the case of Algeria and Ukraine". In European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2007 (10th), May 17-19, 2007, pages 25, Montreal, Canada.

Abstract

The paper deals with effects of the EU on democratization processes in Algeria and Ukraine. Democratizing effects of the EU can be analyzed by following two different points of departure: On the one hand democratic norms can be “communicated” by external policy and strategy. Effects, i.e. compliance, derive from intention, i.e. from purposeful action (Democratization ‘by design’). Democratizing effects, however, can also emerge as unintended consequences of EU policy conducted in other, internal contexts. This kind of external democratization might be called democratization ‘by default’. Center piece, here, is a non-agent driven process of external norm transfer. Compliance, thus, do not derive from intention. Instead, democratizing effects of the EU evolve as an unintended process of diffusion of norms, practices and values. Change emerges ‘by default’. Whereas strategic and social compliance are inherent in democratization ‘by design’ compliance through modeling is at the center of democratization ‘by default’. The paper presents the two analytical perspectives and shows limits of democratization ‘by design’ with regard to its capacity to identify scope and depth of democratic change in what is called ‘big’ states. In those cases a merely analytical focus on policy and political strategy on the one hand and patterns of reactions on the other – it is argued - overemphasizes failures of EU policy and strong resistance in the ‘target’ state. Algeria is presented as a case in point: strategic as well as social compliance are difficult to achieve because Algeria does not need to comply due to its alternative policy options. By adding compliance through modeling democratization ‘by default’ draws attention to a more “neutral” process of change in the ‘target’ state which might be more likely than strategic and social compliance, especially (but not exclusively) in ‘big’ states.