Delegation and Agency in EU Trade Policy-Making: Bringing Brussels Back in

Elsig, Manfred. (2007) Delegation and Agency in EU Trade Policy-Making: Bringing Brussels Back in. In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)

Preview

PDF Download (130Kb) | Preview

Abstract

This paper addresses the political economy of foreign trade policy-making in the European Union (EU). In light of recent developments in global trade regulation towards more regional and bilateral trade arrangements, the paper asks what drives trade-policy-making in the EU? Using a Principal-Agent (PA) framework the paper looks at how institutional and societal factors shape EU trade policymaking and attempts to bring the Community institutions back in. The paper adds to a growing literature on PA that increasingly looks at the agency side of the PA equation. It is argued that the agent (the EU Commission) is neither a master’s servant nor a run-away bureaucrat. The agent is most powerful when setting the agenda and resisting change to its overall strategy. The existence of collective and multiple principals and the multi-level system facilitate agency. Empirically, the paper discusses the use of venues for trade regulation and provides insights from the EU–Mercosur negotiations.

Actions (login required)