Link to the University of Pittsburgh
Link to the University Library SystemContact us link
AEI Banner

"European Governance – Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy"

Borzel, Tanja A. (2007) "European Governance – Negotiation and Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy". In: UNSPECIFIED, Montreal, Canada. (Unpublished)

[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (198Kb) | Preview

    Abstract

    This paper argues that the EU is not as unique a governance system as the Babylonian variety of its labels may suggest. Like its member states, the EU features a combination of different forms of governance that cover the entire range between market and hierarchy. Unlike at the national level, however, this governance mix entails hardly any network forms of governance, which systematically involve private actors. The EU is largely governed by negotiated agreements between inter- and transgovernmental actors. While business, interest groups or civil society organizations are seldom granted a real say in EU policy-making, market-based mechanisms of political competition have gained importance. Thus, the EU is less characterized by network governance but by inter- and transgovernmental negotiations, on the one hand, and political competition between member states and regions, on the other. Both operate in shadow of hierarchy cast by supranational institutions.

    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII (Chicago style) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:
    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > governance: EU & national level
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2007 (10th), May 17-19, 2007
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 09 May 2008
    Page Range: p. 29
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:49
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/7705

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads