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The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

FALLESEN, Ida-Maria Weirsøe (2015) The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015. [Policy Paper]

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    Abstract

    The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

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    Item Type: Policy Paper
    Uncontrolled Keywords: Banking Union, supervision, resolution, Eurozone, financial crisis
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > banks/financial markets
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > College of Europe (Brugge) > Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings (BEEP)
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2016 10:31
    Number of Pages: 33
    Last Modified: 23 Mar 2016 09:11
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/73639

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