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“The political economics of EU enlargement"

Roelfsema, Hein (2003) “The political economics of EU enlargement". In: UNSPECIFIED, Nashville, TN. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    In a theoretical model we show that centralization and enlargement may cause lobbying expenditures to fall. The reason is that due mto the common pool problem associated with centralization, national policy makers in a central committee have stronger incentives to stand up for domestic special interest groups if compared to decentral decision making. Because national politicians act as agents for domestic special interest groups, this reduces the equilibrium level of compensating contributions for domestic lobby groups. Further, we argue that enlargement magnifies the common pool problem and, thus, makes national policy makers even more instrumental to special interest groups. As a result, the cost of lobbying falls.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > governance: EU & national level
    EU policies and themes > Treaty reform > enlargement
    Other > integration theory (see also researching and writing the EU in this section)
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > lobbying/interest representation
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2003 (8th), March 27-29, 2003
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2006
    Page Range: p. 17
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:43
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/6557

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