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Is Regulatory Convergence Efficient? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.3, May 1992

de Beus, Jos (1992) Is Regulatory Convergence Efficient? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.3, May 1992. [Working Paper]

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    One of the important themes in the new institutionalism is the convergence of market regulations in a world with three powerful clusters of countries (Western Europe, North America, and East Asia) on a small number of regimes, like disorganized capitalism, free market capitalism, and coordinated market capitalism. This paper examines the political-economic theory of regulatory convergence. It reconstructs and compares three welfarist approaches: the optimal regulatory regime (Tinbergen), the rule of constitutional law (Buchanan), and regulatory rivalry (Hayek). The paper concludes that most plausible results of convergence theory are completely opposite to the expressed political intentions of the theorists. Tinbergen's theory predicts neoliberalism, not social democracy. The theories of Buchanan and Hayek predict respectively a consensual or spontaneous formation of corporatist regulations, not the return of classical constitutionalism or liberalism. The paper summons new institutionalists to repair the weak scientific elements of convergence theory and to make a distinction between the ideological origins of this theory and its unintended ideological consequences.

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > regulations/regulatory policies
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Harvard University, Center for European Studies > Program for the Study of Germany and European Working Papers Series
    Depositing User: Unnamed user with email
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2015 13:58
    Number of Pages: 31
    Last Modified: 05 Aug 2015 15:51

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