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Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994

Hall, Peter A. (1994) Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994. [Working Paper]

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    Abstract

    This paper explores the fashionable proposition that with a more independent central bank, a country can secure lower levels of inflation without higher unemployment. Hall shows that the operation of the central bank depends on the character of wage bargaining. He illustrates this point with some cross-national data and an analysis of how coordinated wage bargaining is secured in Germany. He concludes by exploring the implications of this analysis for European Monetary Union.

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    Item Type: Working Paper
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > European Central Bank
    Countries > Germany
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > Harvard University, Center for European Studies > Program for the Study of Germany and European Working Papers Series
    Depositing User: Unnamed user with email kms214@pitt.edu
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 22 Apr 2015 10:21
    Number of Pages: 31
    Last Modified: 22 Apr 2015 10:21
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/63694

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