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Discretion and Accountability: The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 30/2014

Nicolaides, Phedon and Prezios, Nadir (2014) Discretion and Accountability: The ESMA Judgment and the Meroni Doctrine. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 30/2014. [Policy Paper]

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    Abstract

    This paper assesses the effectiveness of the Meroni doctrine in the light of the recent judgment in the ESMA case. The first part explains in detail the problem of delegation of powers in the EU from the perspective of the principal-agent theory and complements it with the analysis of the trade-off between different levels of independence and accountability of agencies. A simple economic model is developed to illustrated the relationship between the independence and accountability of an agency. It shows that it is the accountability mechanism that induces the agent to act, rather than the extent of his independence. The paper also explains the inter-temporal interactions between the principal and the agent on the basis of the incentives in place for the different players. The second part is devoted to analysis of the functioning of ESMA in the context of its delegated powers. After the presentation of main aspects of the regulatory framework establishing ESMA, the paper continuous with an analysis and interpretation of the discretionary powers of ESMA. The rather rigid position of the Court of Justice in relation to the Meroni doctrine seems to be unsuitable to delegation of complex regulatory tasks. This is particularly evident in the case of financial markets. Finally, the judgment does not examine in any detail whether and how the principals - i.e. the EU and Member States - are best able to evaluate the quality of ESMA decisions and regulations and whether there are different but more effective accountability mechanisms.

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    Item Type: Policy Paper
    Uncontrolled Keywords: ESMA = European Securities and Markets Authority.
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > law & legal affairs-general (includes international law)
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series and Periodicals: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Series: Series > College of Europe (Brugge) > Bruges European Economic Research Papers (BEER)
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2014 17:05
    Number of Pages: 27
    Last Modified: 02 Apr 2015 11:47
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/57214

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