European Agencies and Their Boards: Too Much Board, Too Little Monitoring

Busuioc, Madalina (2011) European Agencies and Their Boards: Too Much Board, Too Little Monitoring. [Conference Proceedings]

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Abstract

European agencies have become an established part of the European Union's architectural set up and are the most proliferating institutional entities at the EU level. However, as their relevance and prevalence in the EU institutional landscape has increased, so have concerns with regards to the possibility for such bodies to escape scrutiny. This article takes up this issue and investigates a central element of agency accountability: their accountability vis-a-vis the management boards. The main and most direct confines on the grant of authority to agencies and their directors respectively, are represented by the management boards. Given the formal powers exercised by European agencies, it is important to observe to which extent boards are successful in exercising their scrutinising roles. Based on interviews with agency directors as well as board representatives, the paper unravels how these accountability ties operate in practice and identifies recurring weaknesses that seriously impinge upon their effectiveness.

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