Gros, Daniel. (2013) The SRM and the dream to resolve banks without public money. CEPS Commentary, 19 December 2013. [Policy Paper]
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Abstract
In his assessment of the compromise agreement reached on the Single Resolution Mechanisn (SRM), Daniel Gros finds that the popular perception that the periphery has the most to gain from the establishment of a unified resolution regime might have gotten it backwards. In reality, he finds that Germany and other surplus countries have a bigger interest in tying the hands of their national resolution authorities, which have a tendency to be too generous.
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Item Type: | Policy Paper |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Single Resolution Mechanisn (SRM). |
Subjects for non-EU documents: | Countries > Germany |
Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
Series: | Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > CEPS Commentaries |
Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
Official EU Document: | No |
Language: | English |
Date Deposited: | 20 Dec 2013 08:59 |
Number of Pages: | 2 |
Last Modified: | 20 Dec 2013 08:59 |
URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/46343 |
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