Valiante, Diego (2012) The Euro Prisoner's Dilemma. ECMI Commentary No. 32, February 2012. [Policy Paper]
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Abstract
The last intergovernmental agreement among 25 countries and the ESM Treaty will set the ground for greater institutional coordination on fiscal policies among euro area member states. None of these decisions, however, will be able to pull the euro area out of this crisis. The eurozone is trapped in a classic prisoner’s dilemma. The break-up of the euro remains unlikely but the exit strategy will continue to be led by a sequence of rational (but sub-optimal) decisions, which will make the process long and painful.
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Item Type: | Policy Paper |
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Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > fiscal policy EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > financial crisis 2008-on/reforms/economic governance |
Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
Series: | Series > Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels) > ECMI Commentaries |
Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
Official EU Document: | No |
Language: | English |
Date Deposited: | 27 Feb 2012 09:59 |
Number of Pages: | 2 |
Last Modified: | 08 Apr 2014 12:18 |
URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/33754 |
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