Governmental Positions on European Treaty Reforms: Towards a Dynamic Approach.

Finke, Daniel (2009) Governmental Positions on European Treaty Reforms: Towards a Dynamic Approach. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (841Kb) | Preview

Abstract

Governmental positions are a powerful predictor of European treaty reforms. Yet, few empirical studies analyze the conditionalies between positions over different issues or conflict dimensions. If governmental positions are conditional upon the real or expected outcome on other issues, the sequence of decisions becomes increasingly important for our understanding of European treaty reforms. So far, not many studies analyze the sequence of intergovernmental decisions. In the present paper, I argue that governmental preferences over the reform of the EU decision rule dependent on the delegation of competences to the EU and vice versa. Moreover, I present a statistical model which allows for estimating this conditionality. Subsequently, I apply this model to an extensive data set of reform positions revealed by national governments at the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) 2003/4. Next, I analyze the sequence of decision taken by this particular IGC in chronological order. For this purpose, I predict the change of governmental position in response to the decisions over subsets of issues and I compare these predictions to public statements issued by governmental leaders at the time. Finally, I discuss the implications for our understanding of the intergovernmental bargaining outcome.

Actions (login required)