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"Market failures and government failures: A theoretical model of the common agricultural policy"

Nedergaard, Peter. (2005) "Market failures and government failures: A theoretical model of the common agricultural policy". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    Economic theory has tried to explain the characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy on the basis of certain economic peculiarities of agriculture. However, by overlooking the so-called government failures of the political system as an independent variable in explaining the Common Agricultural Policy it is impossible to explain, for example, the strong agricultural lobbyism. The theoretical model of this article integrates economic as well as political actors in order to explain the characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy. The proposed theoretical model is not "tested", but the criteria for such a test are presented.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Uncontrolled Keywords: Rational choice; welfare economics; agricultural economics; government failures.
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > lobbying/interest representation
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > agriculture policy
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2005 (9th), March 31-April 2, 2005
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 03 Mar 2005
    Page Range: p. 41
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:24
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2986

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