Nedergaard, Peter. (2005) "Market failures and government failures: A theoretical model of the common agricultural policy". In: UNSPECIFIED, Austin, Texas. (Unpublished)
![[img]](http://aei.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
| PDF Download (114Kb) | Preview |
Abstract
Economic theory has tried to explain the characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy on the basis of certain economic peculiarities of agriculture. However, by overlooking the so-called government failures of the political system as an independent variable in explaining the Common Agricultural Policy it is impossible to explain, for example, the strong agricultural lobbyism. The theoretical model of this article integrates economic as well as political actors in order to explain the characteristics of the Common Agricultural Policy. The proposed theoretical model is not "tested", but the criteria for such a test are presented.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII (Chicago style) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Rational choice; welfare economics; agricultural economics; government failures. |
| Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > lobbying/interest representation EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > agriculture policy |
| Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
| Conference: | European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2005 (9th), March 31-April 2, 2005 |
| Depositing User: | Phil Wilkin |
| Official EU Document: | No |
| Language: | English |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Mar 2005 |
| Page Range: | p. 41 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Feb 2011 17:24 |
| URI: | http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2986 |
Actions (login required)
| View Item |
![[feed]](/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}
