Tallberg, Jonas. (1997) "Making states comply: EC enforcement and the Internal Market Program". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
This paper offers a theoretical framework for analyzing third-party enforcement in general, and the development of Community enforcement in particular. The analytical framework is based on the tools and logic of the principal-agent literature within the New Institutional Economics, and contributes to an understanding of EC enforcement in primarily three ways. First, by framing the relation between member states and Community institutions in the post-agreement phase as a principal-supervisor-agent relationship, where states (principals), for the sake of self-commitment, assign the Commission and the Court (supervisors) the task of enforcing the implementation of EC law, as delegated to the individual member states (agents). Second, by highlighting two dilemmas or key areas of tension in this relationship--the delegation dilemma facing member states and the enforcement dilemma facing the Commission and the Court. Third, by identifying and disentangling strategies and means of enforcement, such as centralized supervision through the Commission and the ECJ, and decentralized enforcement through individuals safe-guarding their rights under EC law.
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