Jupille, Joseph. (1997) "Institutions, emergent interests, and bargaining power: The European Community and its member states in global politics". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
Abstract
This paper puts forth an institutionalist account of the ways in which the EC shapes international outcomes. EC decision rules can amplify or attenuate the international bargaining power of certain member states, who are thereby able to effect international outcomes which would not have resulted in the absence of the EC. Unanimity rules in the EC will tend to amplify the international bargaining power of the lowest common denominator EC member state and attenuate the bargaining power of states with median preferences. The opposite conclusions pertain under EC qualified majority voting. Either effect will only occur when member states have greater or lesser ability to shape international outcomes when working through the EC than they would have had as free agents. These expectations are probed with two paired comparisons involving EC activity in international environmental negotiations.
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