“The Institutional Determinants of Supranationalism in the European Union”

Tsebelis, George and Garrett, Geoffrey. (1999) “The Institutional Determinants of Supranationalism in the European Union”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

In this article, we demonstrate that the notion of a pervasive and linear increase in supranationalism in the EU is inappropriate and conceals more than it reveals about the dynamics of European integration. We propose a unified model of integration with three distinctive features. First, we analyze the effects of the EU’s treaty base-from Rome to Amsterdam-on the relations among the Union’s three supranational institutions (Commission, Court and Parliament), and between these supranational actors and the intergovernmental Council. Second, our approach distinguishes and analyzes the interactions among three functional elements of the emerging EU polity-legislation and the creation of policy, administration and the implementation of policy, and the judiciary and the adjudication of policy disputes. Finally, we demonstrate that the effective power of each of the EU’s three supranational institutions is different; that each institution’s influence has changed considerably over time (and not in linear fashion); and, that each institution’s power base can be understood in terms of its location in the European political system we describe.

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