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“Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability”

Tallberg, Jonas. (1999) “Supranational Influence in EU Enforcement: The ECJ and the Principle of State Liability”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    The argument here is developed in three stages. First, I explain why the focus on post-decisional enforcement rather than pre-decisional agenda-setting requires an extended principal-supervisor-agent model. Second, I show how the ECJ, by exploiting its judicial independence and member governments’ lack of intrusive monitoring mechanisms, succeeded in introducing a form of decentralized sanctions that national governments on repeated occasion had decided against. Third, I account for member states’ two-folded attempts to sanction the Court and state liability: the failed attack at the 1996-97 IGC, and the temporarily more successful option of inaction at the national level.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > governance: EU & national level
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > law & legal affairs-general (includes international law) > compliance/national implementation
    EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > European Court of Justice/Court of First Instance
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 1999 (6th), June 2-5, 1999
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 15 Dec 2006
    Page Range: p. 32
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:22
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2400

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