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“Beyond Supranational Self-Interest: Commission Officials and European Integration”

Hooghe, Liesbet. (1999) “Beyond Supranational Self-Interest: Commission Officials and European Integration”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    Even if the Commission’s institutional interest is invariably in favor of supranationalism, we know very little about how people with leadership positions in this institution conceive of authority in the European Union. In this chapter I explain why some officials advocate supranational governance while others want to keep authority vested in the member states. In section one, I review earlier studies that give credence to divergent preferences on supranationalism and intergovernmentalism among Commission office holders, and I argue that the root cause for variation lies in the Commission’s inability to insulate its employees from outside influences. In the following sections I hypothesize about the sources of variation in top officials’ preferences, discuss indicators and test hypotheses against the data.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > political affairs > governance: EU & national level
    EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > European Commission
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 1999 (6th), June 2-5, 1999
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 17 Nov 2006
    Page Range: p. 29
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:22
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2297

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