“Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules”

Franchino, Fabio. (1999) “Control of the Commission’s Executive Functions: Uncertainty, Conflict and Decision Rules”. In: UNSPECIFIED, Pittsburgh, PA. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

The literature on implementation committees predominantly emphasizes their informational role and relies on a sui generis characterization of the European Union. This article reasserts their control function and locates these committees within the core tenets of rational choice and agency theory. It takes McCubbins and Page’s (1987) propositions about the determinants of legislators’ control of executive functions and applies these to the Member States’ control of the Commission’s executive powers. The likelihood of establishing ex-post control procedures and the stringency of control are positively correlated with 1) the uncertainty facing legislators about the optimum policy actions, 2) the conflict among legislators and 3) the need of unanimous agreement in the Council of Ministers. Using logistic regressions and a cumulative logic model applied to a stratified sample of non-amending secondary legislation adopted between 1987 and 1998, the article concludes that unanimity, conflict and uncertainty relevantly increase the likelihood of procedural control of the Commission’s activities. Conflict and uncertainty are also relevant factors affecting the stringency of control.

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