“Understanding Economic Regulation of Infrastructures and Utilities in Europe: The Case of Electricity in Comparative Perspective”

Eberlein, Burkard. (1999) “Understanding Economic Regulation of Infrastructures and Utilities in Europe: The Case of Electricity in Comparative Perspective” . In European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 1999 (6th), June 2-5, 1999, Pittsburgh, PA.

Abstract

The paper is organized as follows. In a first, theoretical part, I will unpack the logic and concept of reregulation, arguing that the normative model of efficiency-oriented, expertise-based regulation is an insufficient guide to the positive politics of the regulatory process. While positive economic models and theories of regulation are helpful in identifying some general features and problems, they fail to capture the complex institutional context and variety of the regulatory process. More sophisticated, political-institutionalist accounts are required. These can avoid the opposite danger of a-theoretical description by making use of ‘configurational analysis’ based on comparative empirical research. In a second, empirical part, I illustrate the potential of a political-institutionalist approach by presenting the case of electricity regulation in Europe. Drawing on this case study, I will first, and mainly, map the different dimensions of regulatory variation in the EU multi-level framework. Second, and more briefly, I will try to identify configurational patterns of variables fit to explain the variety of regulatory regimes.