"Legislative powers and lobbyists' channels for the transmission of information in the EC"

Varela, Diego. (2001) "Legislative powers and lobbyists' channels for the transmission of information in the EC". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

This paper tests some hypotheses of an informational model of EC law-making under different legislative procedures developed elsewhere. In concrete, this paper tests four hypotheses on the share of lobbying directed to the EP and the European Commission under the two main legislative procedures of the EC, namely consultation and co-decision. The paper uses statistical evidence from a postal survey of political and public affairs consultants specialized in EU issues. Unlike other surveys, this survey is based on factual questions about particular cases of legislation. The results of the tests are quite supportive of the model's predictions. Finally, the paper's conclusions concentrate not only on the validity of the model, but also on the methodological issues raised by the paper.

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