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"The politics of an emergent global regime for controlling tax competition"

Thomas, Kenneth P. (2001) "The politics of an emergent global regime for controlling tax competition". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    This paper probes what I call the emergent global regime for controlling tax competition. Since at least the early 1990s, states have perceived that competition for investment, whether through direct subsidies or tax incentives, threatens to undermine the fiscal underpinnings of modern state, particularly in terms of its provision of social welfare programs. As states have provided financial or fiscal subsidies to capital (especially mobile capital), the have had to compensate through some combination of imposing higher levels of taxation on other actors, running higher deficits, or cutting spending. Each has shown itself to have substantial problems, and the response of states has now come full circle: to reconsider the competition for investment that causes the fiscal problems in the first place.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects for non-EU documents: EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > tax policy
    EU policies and themes > External relations > international economy
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2001 (7th), May 31-June 2, 2001
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 03 May 2006
    Page Range: p. 27
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:21
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2193

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