Michalowitz, Irina. (2001) "Strategies of Euro-Lobbying". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)
Why is lobbying at the European level sometimes carried out via a European association, a Public Affairs Office, a Political Consultant, or through a combination of these communication channels? This is the question addressed in this project based on Policy Network-Analysis and Rational Choice Theory. It is derived from the assumption that the diversity of lobbying at EU-level is due to different performances of the aforementioned lobbying channels; their efficiency depending on structure, needs and skills of their clients. This provides lobbying-actors with a choice that might be linked to the preferred outcome and can possibly be called a strategy. This Research is carried out by first of all defining the research objects in categories of Policy Network-Analysis, then analyzing the potential link between channel-performance and actors' needs and resources with a Rational Choice-approach and game theoretic tools, and in a third step empirically assessing a selection of the EU-policy areas transport and (electronic) communication.
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