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"Monetary power, bargaining asymmetries and the structural logic of EU exchange rate cooperation"

Kaelberer, Matthias. (2001) "Monetary power, bargaining asymmetries and the structural logic of EU exchange rate cooperation". In: UNSPECIFIED, Madison, Wisconsin. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    The first section of this paper defines the terms "weak" and "strong" currency countries and analyzes the balance of payments positions of the EU member countries. It emphasizes Germany's role as the primary strong currency country in the EU and explains the broad coalition patterns that evolved over time among strong and weak currency countries in European monetary politics. The second section explains the logic of macroeconomic adjustment for weak and strong currency countries. Because they do not face a reserve constraint, strong currency countries have much greater freedom to choose their preferred adjustment option than weak currency countries. Section three explains how much this asymmetry in adjustment options shapes the logic of bargaining over rules of monetary cooperation. Strong currency countries are often in a superior bargaining position and, therefore, tend to yield stronger leverage over bargaining outcomes.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects for non-EU documents: Countries > Germany
    EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > monetary policy
    Subjects for EU documents: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Series: UNSPECIFIED
    ["eprint_fieldname_eusries" not defined]: UNSPECIFIED
    EU Annual Reports: UNSPECIFIED
    Conference: European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2001 (7th), May 31-June 2, 2001
    Depositing User: Phil Wilkin
    Official EU Document: No
    Language: English
    Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2006
    Page Range: p. 23
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2011 17:21
    URI: http://aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2113

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