"Competitive Euro-liberalism and the reform of the German pension system"

Hering, Martin. (2001) "Competitive Euro-liberalism and the reform of the German pension system" . In European Union Studies Association (EUSA) > Biennial Conference > 2001 (7th), May 31-June 2, 2001, pages 31, Madison, Wisconsin.

Abstract

This paper provides an integrated explanation of institutional stability and change in the German pension system. The main explanatory variable is European integration, more specifically the new European institutional framework that has emerged in the context of the single market and monetary union. The argument is, first, that the paradigm of "competitive Euro-liberalism" has been extended from economic policy to pension policy, and second, that EU-level institutions have shaped the ideas and interests of German governments. German governments have come to view the pension system as an important instrument for generating growth and employment. After the mid-1990s, they have formed a preference for fundamental institutional change that contrasts sharply with their previous commitment to preserve the existing arrangements even in the face of strong socioeconomic pressures. As a result of changing ideas and interests about the role of the pension system, the government withdrew the policy-making autonomy delegated to the German pension network, which had dominated pension policy until the mid-1990s. Due to imperfect unity the pension network was no longer able to form a strong "veto network." It lost its capability to defend its autonomy and thus was unable to guarantee the stability of the German pension system.